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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did this Court properly conclude that Mr. Sampson's rights 
against self incrimination were violated when police 
officers failed to clarify his equivocal reference to 
counsel while undergoing custodial interrogation? 
Is the exclusionary rule properly applied to the 
circumstances of the police misconduct in this case? 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ANSWER TO STATE'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, : Case No. 890327-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Sampson was charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder in 
the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). Prior to trial, he filed a 
motion to suppress statements and evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda and fifth amendment protections. The trial court denied the 
motion, and Defendant was ultimately convicted at a jury trial held 
September 22-30, 1987, in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, Judge, 
presiding. That judge sentenced Mr. Sampson to a term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Sampson appealed, alleging eight errors requiring 
reversal of the conviction. This Court heard that appeal and, on 
September 11, 1990, issued an opinion addressing but one issue, the 
violation of Mr. Sampson's protections against self-incrimination, 
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v. 
Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 9/11/90); See opinion 
attached at Addendum A. The State filed a Petition for Rehearing of 
that decision and this Court invited Mr, Sampson to respond to the 
State's Petition. 
At the filing of this Answer, Mr. Sampson remains 
incarcerated at the State Prison, the trial court having refused to 
this point to hear his Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Sampson included within his opening brief a detailed 
rendition of the facts in this case. The Court's opinion similarly 
sets forth the facts pertinent to this Answer. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court properly decided that Mr. Sampson's conviction 
required reversal in light of improper tactics by police in 
continuing to interrogate him without clarifying his equivocal 
reference to an attorney to assist him. The State waived the 
opportunity to argue that the second set of Miranda warnings after 
Mr. Sampson had taken the police to recover the dead child's body 
cleansed the taint of the prior impropriety; and in any event, that 
premise is erroneously proposed under the guiding case law. 
The exclusionary rule is properly invoked in the context 
of the Fifth Amendment violations concerning the right to have 
counsel assist during custodial interrogations when those rights are 
violated by improper police tactics. 
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ARGUMENT 
The State's Petition for Rehearing asserts that this 
Court misapprehended the law when ruling that the police officers7 
failure to properly clarify Mr. Sampson's equivocal reference for an 
attorney required suppression of statements and evidence mandating 
reversal of his conviction and a remand for new trial. 
Specifically, the State complains that this Court's 
decision failed to consider that a subsequent set of Miranda 
warnings offered by police after Mr. Sampson already directed 
authorities to the body of his dead child somehow removed the taint 
from the concededly violative prior attempt to adequately and 
effectively alert Mr. Sampson to his rights against 
self-incrimination, particularly the right to have legal counsel 
present to assist him in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police. State's Petition at 5-14. 
Additionally, the State urges that the body of the child 
is nonetheless admissible despite the violation of the protection 
against self-incrimination. 
It is the State's position on rehearing, not this Court's 
opinion, which misapprehends the law. The Petition accordingly 
should be denied. 
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POINT I. MR. SAMPSONS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AS OUTLINED IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
AND AS PROTECTED BY MIRANDA WERE VIOLATED AND 
REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. 
A. WAIVER 
The State concedes, consistent with Smith v. Illinois, 
469 U.S. 91 (1984), and State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 
1988), that Sergeant Elliott and Sheriff Hayward neglected to follow 
proper requirements to clarify the equivocal reference to counsel 
made by Mr. Sampson prior to the polygraph examination. State's 
Petition at 10-11. For the first time now on Petition for 
Rehearing, however, the State contends this error is rendered 
harmless and otherwise is cured by supposed proper Miranda warnings 
given after Mr. Sampson responded that he knew the whereabouts of 
Miyako and then directed authorities to the dead body of the child. 
State's Petition at 13-14. 
This Court has previously ruled that the State is 
precluded from raising issues such as these for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah App. 1990), 
cert, denied No. 900238 (Utah 10/23/90). This Court recognized in 
its opinion that the State neglected to present this argument 
before, now raising if for the first time in its Petition for 
Rehearing. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 20 n.14 (Utah App. 
9/11/90). Accordingly, the same rationale from Marshall in support 
of waiver must apply in the context of petitions for rehearing where 
the issues were not raised by the State earlier. 
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B. SUBSEQUENT MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE ALSO IMPROPER 
AND VIOLATIVE OR MR. SAMPSON'S RIGHTS. 
The State heavily relies on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298 (1985), for its proposition that subsequent warnings and 
interrogation salvage the impropriety of the first warnings. 
State's Petition at 5-9, 12-13, 15-18. An excerpt cited by the 
State from the decision in Oregon v. Elstad best divulges the 
State's analytical error. 
We must conclude that, absent deliberately 
coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the 
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect 
has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a 
presumption of compulsion. A subseguent 
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect 
who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement 
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions 
that precluded admission of the earlier statement. 
470 U.S. at 314 (cited in State's Petition at 8-9) (emphasis added). 
In this case now on review, improper tactics and/or 
coercive tactics occurred as this Court ruled in its opinion, 
Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, 18, 20 n.14, in that Sergeant 
Elliott and Sheriff Hayward never qualified the equivocal reference 
to counsel as required by Smith v. Illinois and State v. Griffin. 
Accordingly, the State cannot claim that the statements and evidence 
flowing from the Smith/Griffin error are voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent on the part of Mr. Sampson. Neither can the State 
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support its burden to indicate a valid waiver of Mr, Sampson's right 
to counsel as guaranteed by the fifth amendment as this Court also 
ruled. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16-18. 
This case is not like Elstad where the defendant had not 
been warned before the initial statement. Here, Mr. Sampson was 
warned but then the officer effectively withdrew the warning and 
encouraged Mr. Sampson to continue without the benefit of counsel, 
rather than clarify the equivocal reference regarding the assistance 
of counsel. These distinctions render Elstad of little value to the 
resolution of this case. 
Another case heavily relied on by the State is Martin v. 
Wainwriqht, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 479 U.S. 909 
(1986), modified in part, 781 P.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1986). State's 
Petition 11-13, 15. The State relies on Martin because there the 
court examined an equivocal request to cut off questioning, i.e., 
invocation of the right to remain silent, by deciding that while the 
confession which followed was inadmissible because the police failed 
to clarify the request, that nonetheless a subsequent proper warning 
under Miranda resulted in the admission of the first confession as 
harmless error. State's Petition at 11-12. The State argues that 
this case supports its position because the Fifth Amendment's 
companion right to have an attorney present during questioning 
should be handled in similar fashion after an equivocal invocation 
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of that right as occurred in this case. State's Petition at 13-14. 
The State's reasoning is faulty, however, and contrary to United 
States Supreme Court authority. 
In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), a decision 
subsequent to both Oregon v. Elstad and Martin v. Wainwriqht, the 
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981), holding that once a suspect has requested the assistance 
of counsel in dealing with custodial interrogation, police may not 
interrogate him on that charge or any other charge without first 
supplying counsel as requested or without the accused, not police, 
initiating the questioning. 486 U.S. at 685-86. In so ruling the 
United States Supreme Court also reiterated an earlier principle 
overlooked by the State in its petition. The Roberson Court, citing 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101 n.7 (1975), reminded that a 
clear distinction exists between a suspect's decision to cut off 
questioning and the same suspect's request for the assistance of 
counsel. 486 U.S. at 683. 
While Mosley held that police must immediately cease the 
interrogation once the right to cut off questioning has been 
asserted, that opinion also permitted police to resume interrogation 
after the passage of a significant time period and after providing a 
fresh set of Miranda warnings. 423 U.S. at 106. The Roberson Court 
rejected that same position regarding the request for assistance of 
counsel. Regarding the right to have counsel present during 
questioning the Court adhered to the "bright-line" rule of Edwards 
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that interrogation must immediately cease and may not resume even 
after an extended period of time and even with new Miranda warnings 
unless the attorney is provided or the accused initiates the 
questioning. 486 U.S. at 682. 
The rationale for treating the two fifth amendment 
safeguards distinct was explained as follows: 
The rule in Miranda . . . was based on 
this Court's perception that the lawyer 
occupies a critical position in our legal 
system because of his unique ability to 
protect the fifth amendment rights of a 
client undergoing custodial 
interrogation. Because of this special 
ability of the lawyer to help the client 
preserve his fifth amendment rights once 
the client becomes enmeshed in the 
adversary process, the Court found that 
"the right to have counsel present at the 
interrogation is indispensable to the 
protection of the fifth amendment 
privilege under the system" established by 
the Court. 
486 U.S. at 682-83 n.4 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 
(1979)). Accordingly, the State is wrong when arguing that the 
analysis in Martin v. Wainwright should guide this Court on 
rehearing. 
The equivocal nature of the invocation of the right to 
have counsel present during custodial interrogation must not draw 
this Court away from the Edwards and Roberson decisions. The 
Supreme Court's direction in those cases indicate proper attention 
should be placed on a defendant's request for counsel and in light 
of his feeling of inadequacy to deal with custodial interrogation 
without the assistance of counsel. Additionally, this Court must 
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also be cognizant that the United States Supreme Court has also 
mandated that the balancing of this question should always be in 
favor of the defendants. See# e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 4 30 U.S. 
387, 404 (1977) (when examining alleged waiver of right to counsel, 
courts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against 
waiver). 
POINT II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS PROPERLY 
APPLIED IN THIS CASE. 
When Detective Judd re-Mirandized Mr. Sampson, he did so 
in violation of Miranda and his fifth amendment rights against self 
incrimination, particularly the right to have counsel assist in 
custodial interrogation. Because neither Sgt. Elliott nor Sheriff 
Hayward clarified the equivocal reference to counsel asserted by Mr. 
Sampson, their interrogations were in violation of the protections 
discussed in Point I above. Because an attorney was not supplied to 
Mr. Sampson and because he did not initiate questioning, the 
interrogation by Detective Judd was also fatally flawed despite new 
Miranda warnings. 
The State's assertion, then, that this interrogation 
session by Detective Judd cured the prior tainted statements and 
evidence is without merit. The resulting conclusion reached by the 
State that the body of the dead child is admissible is also 
incorrect. 
- 9 -
In its opinion in this case, this Court properly relied 
on Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for the premise that the 
exclusionary rule is applicable in this case. In Nix v. Williams, 
the United States Supreme Court indicated: 
The court rationale consistently advanced 
by this Court for extending the 
exclusionary rule to evidence that is the 
fruit of unlawful police conduct has been 
that this admittedly drastic and socially 
costly course is needed to deter police 
from violations of constitutional and 
statutory protections. This Court has 
accepted the argument that the way to 
ensure such protections is to exclude 
evidence seized as the result of such 
violations notwithstanding the high social 
costs of letting persons obviously guilty 
go unpunished for their crimes. 
467 U.S. at 442. In so delineating the rational of the exclusionary 
rule, the Court in Nix v. Williams pointed out that the exclusionary 
rule has not been limited to a fourth amendment analysis but has 
also been applied by the United States Supreme Court where the 
violations were of the sixth amendment as well as the fifth 
amendment as involved in this case. Id. at 442, 442 n.3. The cases 
cited by the State in Point II of its petition are without 
significance because they rely on a faulty premise of a proper 
second interrogation conducted by Detective Judd contrary to the law 
and facts. Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's 
Petition. 
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POINT III. THE REMAINING ISSUES ADVANCED BY 
MR, SAMPSON REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. 
Mr. Sampson reminds this Court that in considering the 
Stated Petition for Rehearing seven issues briefed by him on appeal 
remain unaddressed by this Court. If this Court should decide to 
grant rehearing on the issue of the violation of his Miranda and 
fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, Mr. Sampson 
requests this Court to also address those issues which remain and to 
reverse his conviction on the grounds stated therein. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sampson respectfully requests that this Court deny 
the State's Petition for Rehtearing. 
DATED this / """ day of November, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
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DELIVERED by this day 
of November, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
12 State v. Lovegren 143 Utah Adv. Ren. 9 
CODE• Co 
Provo, Utah 
chance I get when I can prove it." Finally he stated: 
"Oh usually in the summer we will write ... one or 
two a month I guess." This unrebutted testimony 
suggests that officers in the area routinely stop 
drivers for following too closely. See United States 
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(distinguishing routine stops from pretext stops). 
Defendants failed to produce any contradictory 
evidence and in the absence of such evidence, the 
stop appears to have been valid. 
To support their pretext argument, defendants cite 
State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1990). In Ar-
royo, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's determination that a stop was a pretext to 
search for drugs. Id. at 15. The alleged violation in 
that case was also following too closely. However, 
that case is readily distinguishable. First, the trial 
court found that no violation had occurred because 
the vehicle was traveling approximately nine car 
lengths behind the car in front. Id. at 18 n.14. 
Second, the officer's testimony clearly indicated 
that the purpose for the stop was to investigate a 
suspicion wholly unrelated to the alleged violation. Id. 
The stop in Arroyo is a classic pretext stop. 
The undisputed facts in this case indicate that 
defendants' automobile was traveling 65 miles an 
hour and one-and-a-half car lengths behind the 
car in front. These facts present a clear violation of 
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62 
(1988). Moreover, the undisputed facts do not 
suggest that the officer had any other purpose for 
stopping the vehicle except to issue a citation for 
following too closely and for failure to wear seatb-
elts. The facts in this case simply do not indicate 
that the stop was "a pretext to search for evidence 
of a more serious crime." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. 
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the stop 
was proper appears to be correct. 
11. The trial court's inadequate findings also placed 
appellate counsel at a disadvantage in framing and 
developing their arguments on appeal. Both sides 
recognized this difficulty at oral argument and both 
sides suggested remand for more detailed findings as 
an appropriate remedy. By subsequent correspond-
ence, defendants have taken the position that Sfare 
v. Robinson, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Ct. App. 
1990), makes remand unnecessary and entitles them 
to reversal. We are not persuaded. Review of the 
Robinson opinion confirms that the trial court in 
that case made adequate, detailed findings that 
facilitated meaningful appellate review of the trial 
court's legal conclusions. 
Cite as 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Carlos R. SAMPSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890327-CA 
FILED: September 11, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
ATTORNEYS: 
Andrew A. Valdez, Elizabeth A. Bowman, 
and Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and 
Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction for crim-
inal homicide, murder in the second degree, a 
first degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). We reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
On November 24, 1986, at approximately 
10:30 p.m., defendant entered a 7-Eleven 
store in Salt Lake County and told the clerks 
that his daughter had been kidnapped. He 
asked them to call the police, which they did. 
Deputies from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office responded. Defendant info-
rmed them that his daughter had been abdu-
cted from his truck. He gave them a descrip-
tion of his daughter and a photograph. The 
officers investigated the alleged kidnapping 
until 4:00 a.m. At some point during the 
evening, defendant was informed the police 
did not believe his story. The officers asked 
defendant to come to headquarters the follo-
wing morning for a polygraph examination. 
He agreed. 
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on November 
25, defendant arrived at police headquarters. 
He was met by the polygraph examiner, Ser-
geant Elliot, who had been briefed about the 
events which occurred on the prior evening. 
Defendant was escorted to a small interroga-
tion room, hooked up to a polygraph 
machine, and instructed about how polygraph 
machines worked. Sgt. Elliot then explained 
the purpose for giving defendant the test. He 
said: 
When we walk out of here we ought 
to be able to tell the detectives 
14J utan Adv. Rep. 12 13 
Carlos is truthful when he says the 
child was taken out of the truck, he 
had not prearranged with anyone to 
take the child. Uh, also, Carlos is 
not involved in the death of the 
child if the child is, in fact, dead. 
And, uh, those are the two things 
that we will accomplish today.1 
After explaining to defendant the purpose 
of the test, Sgt. Elliot gave defendant the Miran-
da warnings. He began by stating: 
" Because you are in the cop shop there is no 
doubt in your mind that this is the police 
station and, uh, because you are in taking a 
polygraph from a law enforcement agency I 
must advise you of your rights again."2 After 
reading defendant each of his rights, the foll-
owing exchange ensued: 
Elliot: Okay, having these rights in 
mind do you wish to talk to me 
now. 
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a 
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not 
worried about anything, it is just 
that.... 
Elliot: Okay, if you are not worried 
about anything I would say that is 
fine, let's go ahead and proceed. 
Let's get this thing done and get it 
over with and see what we can do. 
Sampson: I'm willing to get it over 
with. 
Defendant then read and signed a form listing 
his Miranda rights and indicating his willing-
ness to take the polygraph test. 
During the polygraph examination, Sgt. 
Elliot asked defendant whether he arranged 
the disappearance or caused the death of his 
child and whether he knew where she was 
hidden.3 He asked defendant this series of 
questions four times. To the question concer-
ning where his daughter was hidden, defen-
dant responded in the negative each time and 
each time the polygraph suggested a deceitful 
response. After the last set of questions, Sgt. 
Elliot informed defendant about the test 
results. He asked defendant why his response 
to the question concerning whether he knew 
where his daughter was hidden appeared to be 
false. Defendant said he thought maybe the 
child's mother had done something with her. 
After concluding the examination, Sgt. 
Elliot and defendant went to find Salt Lake 
County Sheriff Pete Hayward. Sgt. Elliot told 
Sheriff Hayward about the test results. He 
told him that he believed defendant had been 
untruthful and informed him that defendant 
had been "Mirandized," but apparently did 
not acquaint the sheriff with the particulars of 
defendant's responses after his rights had been 
read to him. 
Sheriff Hayward then returned with defen-
dant to the polygraph room for further ques-
tioning. He did not give defendant the 
Miranda warnings.4 He informed defendant 
that there were inconsistencies in his story and 
that he did not believe defendant was telling 
the truth. He then asked defendant whether he 
had injured his daughter. Ultimately, defen-
dant stated his daughter was dead and that he 
could show the police where she was located. 
Defendant accompanied Sheriff Hayward 
and another deputy to a dumpster in Amer-
ican Fork where his daughter's body was 
located. After retrieving the body, the officers 
placed defendant under arrest and returned 
him to Salt Lake City. When the officers 
again met with defendant, defendant was read 
his Miranda rights. He agreed to talk with the 
investigating officer, who thereafter questi-
oned him concerning the circumstances surr-
ounding his daughter's death. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion 
to suppress all statements made by defendant 
during and after the polygraph examination on 
November 25, 1986, and all evidence derived 
as a result of those statements. Counsel argued 
that the police officers had violated defen-
dant's Miranda rights by continuing to ques-
tion him after he made an equivocal request 
for counsel. The trial court denied the motion. 
In support of its decision to deny defen-
dant's motion to suppress, the court stated in 
pertinent part: 
The court finds, first, that as you 
have agreed, the standard of evid-
ence must be a preponderance of 
the evidence5 to establish the volu-
ntariness of the interrogation and 
waiver. 
Court finds that the defendant 
clearly understood what his rights 
were and what he was waiving, that 
there is nothing in the record to 
show that the police did anything or 
acted in any way improperly so as 
to constitute any kind of coercion6 
in this matter so as to cause the 
defendant not to fully understand 
his rights and to leave him in a 
position where he was acting in a 
coerced sort of way.... 
I believe he had an unfettered 
right of choice, that he did not 
request an attorney, that the lang-
uage "Well, ah, should I have a 
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not 
worried about anything, it is just 
that ..." is not sufficient to cause 
the police to be concerned as to the 
claim or any suggestion that the 
defendant wished to claim a right to 
counsel. 
I also find that there was no need 
to give continuous advice as to 
subsequent requests for the selection 
of counsel7 or the waiver of the 
same. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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I also find further that the forum 
was adequate, the [rights] were 
clearly explained to the defendant. 
He voluntarily and knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and I 
cannot find that the motion to 
suppress should be granted and, 
therefore, it is denied. 
A five-day jury trial was held in September 
1987. Having lost his motion to suppress, 
defendant sought and obtained a continuing 
objection to the admission of evidence resul-
ting from the police interrogation. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury found defen-
dant guilty of second degree homicide. He was 
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the 
Utah State Prison. 
Defendant has raised numerous issues on 
appeal, but his primary contention is that the 
court committed prejudicial error when it 
denied his motion to suppress. Because we 
must reverse and remand on this issue, we 
need not address the other issues raised by 
defendant. 
Neither party has identified the standard of 
review for this appeal. However, both parties 
apparently concede that the trial court's ulti-
mate conclusions concerning the waiver of 
defendant's Miranda rights, which conclusions 
were based upon essentially undisputed facts, 
in particular the transcript of Sgt. Elliot's 
colloquy with defendant, present questions of 
law reviewable under a correction-of-error 
standard. Such a conclusion is consistent with 
the general notion that a trial court's 
"findings" based upon undisputed facts 
present questions of law on appeal. Diversified 
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Assoc, 
739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting City of Spencer v. Hawkey Sec. Ins. 
Co., 216 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974)). Cf. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie 
Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 
1990) (same standard for review of summary 
judgment, which necessarily involves undisp-
uted facts). See also People v. Russo, 148 Cal. 
App. 3d 1172, 1% Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) 
(where Miranda warnings and ensuing discu-
ssion were recorded, facts deemed undisputed 
and appellate court required to "independently 
assess whether [defendant] knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights"). Thus, we do 
not accord any particular deference to the trial 
court's conclusions, although couched as 
findings, but, rather, review them for correc-
tness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
the United States Supreme Court stated that 
"the prosecution may not use statements ... 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 
444. One of those procedural safeguards is a 
warning that the defendant has the right to an 
attorney during custodial interrogation. Id. 
Moreover, the Court noted that if defendant 
"indicates in any manner and at any stage of 
the process that he wishes to consult with an 
attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning." Id. at 444-45. Finally, when 
custodial interrogation continues without the 
presence of a defense attorney and damaging 
evidence results from the interrogation, the 
state has a heavy burden to show that the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his Miranda rights. Id. at 475. 
We must address two questions in this 
appeal. First, we must determine whether 
defendant was subject to "custodial interrog-
ation" at the time he made his incriminating 
statements. Second, assuming custodial inter-
rogation, we must determine whether defen-
dant requested, or knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to, counsel. 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
Initially, defendant claims the state failed to 
raise below the issue of whether there actually 
was a "custodial interrogation" and thus 
should be precluded from arguing on appeal 
that there was not. See generally State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Though we agree the state did not 
dwell on the issue, it was sufficiently raised at 
the suppression hearing to be preserved for 
this appeal. We note, however, that the trial 
court did not base its denial of the motion to 
suppress upon the lack of custody nor intimate 
any doubt that the colloquy between Sgt. 
Elliot and defendant occurred in conjunction 
with a custodial interrogation. Instead, it 
concluded that defendant was informed of his 
rights, understood his rights, and voluntarily 
waived them-conclusions which would be 
irrelevant if the court thought there had been 
no custodial interrogation. 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme 
Court defined "custodial interrogation" as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way." Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court 
expanded on this definition in Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). 
"Miranda warnings are required only where 
there has been such a restriction on a person's 
freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" Id. at 
495. Later, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121 (1983) (per curiam), the Court stated that 
"the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is 
a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement' of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest." Id. at 1125. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that the test is an objective one, 
i.e., that "the only relevant inquiry is how a 
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reasonable man in the suspect's position 
would have understood his situation." Berk-
emer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). See, 
e.g.. Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 
(Alaska 1979) (The question is not whether the 
particular defendant considered himself in 
custody, but whether a "reasonable person 
[under the same circumstances] would feel he 
was not free to leave and break off police 
questioning."); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 
501 P.2d 468, 471 (1972) (en banc). 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified 
several key factors to consider in order to 
determine when a defendant 
who has not been formally arrested 
is in custody. They are: (1) the site 
of interrogation; (2) whether the 
invest igation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the objective 
. indicia of arrest were present; and 
(4) the length and form of interro-
gation. 
Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 
(Utah 1983). Another factor which we find 
pertinent to our analysis was recognized by 
our Oregon counterpart in State v. Herrera, 49 
Or. App. 1075, 621 P.2d 1209 (1980). That 
factor is (5) whether the defendant came to the 
place of interrogation freely and willingly. Id. 
at 1212. We now apply these five factors, 
along with the objective standard adopted in 
Berkemer, to the undisputed facts in this case. 
A brief mention of factors (1), (3) and (5) is 
sufficient because we find them relatively 
"neutral." Concerning factor (1), the site of 
interrogation was the police station. Station-
house questioning lends itself to a finding of 
custody, a concept which Sgt. Elliot recogn-
ized in his "cop shop" introductory remark, 
although that fact alone is not conclusive. See, 
e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. Considering 
factor (3), defendant was apparently not sec-
urely restrained or told that he was under 
arrest until after his daughter's body was 
discovered. However, it is pertinent to note 
that he was not specifically informed of his 
freedom to leave* and that once the polygraph 
examination started, he was restrained in the 
limited sense that he was hooked to the poly-
graph machine.9 Turning to factor (5), the 
defendant went voluntarily to the police 
station after receiving an invitation to do so. 
The fact that he went voluntarily, however, 
does not mean he was free to leave during the 
entire remainder of the interrogation. 
The two factors which conclusively tip the 
scale and persuade us that defendant was in 
custody are factors (2), the focus of the inve-
stigation, and (4), the form of the interroga-
tion. The interplay of these two factors at the 
time defendant made incriminating statements 
would lead a reasonable person to believe that 
he was not free to leave. 
Concerning factor (2), the state essentially 
concedes that the investigation in this case had 
focused exclusively on defendant. Before the 
conclusion of the evening when defendant 
reported the fictitious kidnapping, officers had 
informed defendant that they did not believe 
his story. As a result of their disbelief, they 
requested defendant to return the following 
morning for a polygraph test. Nothing in the 
record suggests other suspects were sought or 
questioned, or other leads pursued, in the 
meanwhile. The questions asked during the 
polygraph examination clearly indicate a 
strong suspicion that defendant had kidnapped 
or killed his own daughter. It is obvious from 
these facts that defendant was the prime, if 
not exclusive, suspect of the police investiga-
tion. A reasonable person under the circums-
tances would surely so have concluded, espe-
cially given the expressed disbelief at his story. 
Finally, factor (4) weighs heavily in favor of 
a determination of custody. Utah courts have 
placed a great deal of emphasis on the form of 
the questioning in these types of cases. As 
long as questioning remains merely investiga-
tory, courts have not found custody. See, e.g., 
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986). 
However, when investigatory questioning 
shifts to accusatory questioning, custody is 
likely and Miranda warnings become neces-
sary. Camer, 664 P.2d at 1170. See also Kelly, 
718 P.2d at 391. The change from investiga-
tory to accusatory questioning occurs when the 
"police have reasonable grounds to believe 
that a crime has been committed and also 
reasonable grounds to believe that the defen-
dant committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171. 
See also Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the poly-
graph examination itself was merely investig-
atory,10 we find that the questioning became 
accusatory when Sgt. Elliot and Sheriff 
Hayward determined that defendant had lied 
on the exam. The officers knew prior to the 
polygraph exam that a crime had been com-
mitted. They suspected kidnapping and poss-
ibly even murder. Moreover, they clearly sus-
pected defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The polygraph exam results merely 
confirmed their suspicions. Knowing the sus-
picions of the police and then being confro-
nted with the polygraph exam results, a reas-
onable person in defendant's position would 
not have considered himself free to leave at 
that time.11 Thus, we hold that, at least as of 
the time of Sheriff Hayward's questioning of 
defendant, defendant was subject to custodial 
interrogation and entitled to proper Miranda 
warnings. 
This case is similar to, and the result we 
reach consistent with, the Colorado case of Peo-
ple v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 
(1972) (en banc). In Algien, the defendant, 
along with other individuals, was suspected of 
arson. 501 P.2d at 469. He voluntarily subm-
itted to a polygraph examination. Id. At no 
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time was he advised of his Miranda rights. Id. 
at 470. Prior to the examination he was info-
rmed that the purpose of the test was to det-
ermine his involvement in the fire. Id. at 469-
70. He was then asked questions concerning 
his guilt. Id. The exam was given three times 
and each time the test indicated his negative 
responses were not truthful. Id. at 470. At the 
conclusion of the test, he was confronted with 
the opinion that he was lying and, after disc-
ussing the matter, defendant confessed. Id. 
The trial court in Algien found that once 
the officers concluded defendant was lying 
during the exam, the suspicion of guilt focused 
on him and the officers should have read him 
his Miranda rights. Id. The Colorado Supreme 
Court agreed with the trial court and held that 
"a reasonable person would with logic conc-
lude that he could not leave the premises of 
his own free will but would be detained for 
formal arrest." Id. at 471. Consequently, it 
affirmed the decision of the trial court to 
suppress defendant's confession. 
Other courts have applied an A/g/en-type 
analysis to post-polygraph confessions. See, 
e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 
1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not 
advised of their Miranda rights, or do not 
properly waive them, confessions elicited after 
a polygraph test are typically suppressed."); 
People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891, 513 
N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession 
admissible because defendant appeared volu-
ntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of 
rights before post-polygraph confession). The 
rationale of these polygraph cases comports 
with our view of custodial interrogation and 
thus we adopt their reasoning in this case. 
We need not decide whether defendant was 
in custody from the inception of the polygraph 
examination12 because no confession was eli-
cited until after the exam was completed and 
the sheriff summoned. It is sufficient to con-
clude that, Sgt. Elliot having determined def-
endant was lying in the exam, Miranda war-
nings were necessary before further questio-
ning could properly proceed. 
It is clear from the record that defendant 
was not given Miranda warnings between the 
conclusion of the polygraph exam and the 
time he was formally arrested.13 Thus, unless 
we find that defendant's Miranda rights were 
adequately protected by reason of the exch-
ange at the outset of the polygraph examina-
tion undertaken by Sgt. Elliot,14 there was no 
adequate "Mirandizing" of defendant before 
he gave his custodial confession. We now 
examine whether defendant validly waived his 
Miranda rights at that time. 
WAIVER 
On appeal, defendant does not argue that 
the state failed to adequately inform him of 
his Miranda rights. Prior to the polygraph 
examination. Sgt. Elliot carefully informed 
defendant of each of his rights. Instead, def-
endant argues that he made an "equivocal 
request" for counsel which the state failed to 
clarify and, if appropriate, to honor. It is 
telling that the state does not address this issue 
on appeal, but instead puts all its eggs in the 
"no custodial interrogation" basket. Noneth-
eless, because the state stops short of conce-
ding the point and in view of its importance, 
we will address the issue in some detail. 
Initially we note that, though a defendant 
may waive his rights to remain silent and to 
have an attorney present during custodial 
interrogation, "these waivers must be both 
intentional and made with full knowledge of 
the consequences, and the defendant is given 
the benefit of every reasonable presumption 
against such a waiver." State v. Fulton, 742 
P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 
U.S. 1044 (1988). See also Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). Consequently, the 
state has a heavy burden to establish both that 
a defendant understood his Miranda rights 
and that he voluntarily waived them. State v. 
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1986). 
The state argued below, and the trial court 
found, that defendant's statement "Well, ah, 
should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm 
really not worried about anything, it is just 
that ..." did not qualify as even an equivocal 
request for counsel which the police had to be 
concerned about. We disagree. 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: "If [defendant] indicates in any 
manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking there can be no questioning." 384 
U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added). Thus, a 
defendant's "request for counsel may be 
ambiguous or equivocal," Smith v. Illinois, 
469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam), and still 
qualify as an invocation of Miranda rights. 
This court dealt with an equivocal request 
for counsel in State v. Griffin, ISA P.2d 965 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Griffin, the defen-
dant stated during interrogation, "This is a lie. 
I'm calling an attorney." Id. at 966. We held 
that this statement "was arguably equivocal." 
Id. at 969. Defendant's statement in this case 
was less forceful than that in Griffin. 
However, other jurisdictions have found sta-
tements very similar to the one in this case to 
have constituted equivocal requests for 
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 
733 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Maybe I 
should talk to an attorney before I make a 
further statement."), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
1056 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 
1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("might want to 
talk to a lawye *), cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988); United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F. 
Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.) 
("maybe it would be good to have a lawyer"); 
Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 618 (Wyo. 
iQft^  /aft#»r h*»ine asked if he wanted to talk, 
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defendant responded "Well I don't care, I'd 
like to see a lawyer, too you know"); Hampel 
v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1985) ("I've got one question ... [and 
the question is concerning a lawyer] ... how 
would I be able to get one, a lawyer?"); People 
v. Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 
Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) ("I don't know if I 
should have a lawyer here or what."); State v. 
Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074, 1083 
(Ct. App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an attorney"); 
State v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 
1001, 1003 (1983) ("Do you think I need an 
attorney?"). See also United States v. Porter, 
764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call 
to attorney's office in presence of officer 
treated as equivocal request for counsel), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); People v. Quirk, 
129 Cal. App. 3d 618, 181 Cal. Rptr. 301, 308 
(1982) (inquiry by defendant as to whether 
wife had hired an attorney treated as equivocal 
request for counsel). We hold that defendant's 
statement in this case was of a caliber similar 
to those just quoted, and like them, constit-
uted an equivocal request for counsel.15 See also 
Comment, Equivocal Requests for 
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy 
Considerations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 770-71 
(1987) [hereinafter "The Cincinnati 
Comment"] (categorizing recurring types of 
equivocal requests for counsel, including as 
one category "[i]ndecisive statements that 
indicate uncertainty in the suspect's mind 
about the need or advisability of obtaining 
legal representation"). 
Courts have developed different standards 
to handle equivocal requests for counsel. The 
United States Supreme Court identified three 
methods for handling equivocal requests in 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n.3 
(1984), but declined to identify any of them as 
the constitutionally correct one. 
Some courts have held that all 
questioning must cease upon any 
request for or reference to counsel, 
however equivocal or ambiguous.... 
Others have attempted to define a 
threshold standard of clarity for 
such requests, and have held that 
requests falling below this threshold 
do not trigger the right to 
counsel.... Still others have adopted 
a third approach, holding that when 
an accused makes an equivocal 
statement that "arguably" can be 
construed as a request for counsel, 
all interrogation must immediately 
cease except for narrow questions 
designed to "clarify" the earlier 
statement and the accused's desires 
respecting counsel. 
Id. at 96 n.3 (emphasis added). In Griffin, this 
court adopted the third approach, holding 
"that when an accused makes an arguably 
equivocal request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be 
limited to clarifying the request." 754 P.2d at 
969. We remain convinced that this middle 
approach16 is preferable to either of the two 
more extreme positions and note that it is 
regarded as the majority view. Note, Judicial 
Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for 
Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460, 472 
(1987) [hereinafter "The Notre Dame Note"]. 
It is also favored by commentators as the 
approach which best balances the interests of 
law enforcement and the rights of the accused. 
See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel During 
Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal References 
to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159, 1187-
94 (1986); The Notre Dame Note at 472-73; 
The Cincinnati Comment at 783. 
Unfortunately, neither Sgt. Elliot nor 
Sheriff Hayward attempted to clarify defen-
dant's equivocal reference to an attorney. The 
transcript of the polygraph examination-
and the actual tape is not part of our record-
indicates a pause following defendant's equi-
vocal statements about counsel after which 
Sgt. Elliot stated "Okay, if you are not 
worried about anything I would say that is 
fine, let's go ahead and proceed." Nothing in 
this statement by Sgt. Elliot nor any subseq-
uent statement amounts to an effort to clarify 
defendant's request. Although, as indicated 
previously, the state did not see fit to brief the 
"equivocal request for counsel" issues on 
appeal, it argued below that defendant's 
subsequent statement that he was "willing to 
get it over with" was sufficient to clarify his 
position and to demonstrate a waiver of his 
right to counsel.17 We disagree. 
This case is similar to United States v. 
Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981) (mem.), and State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 
880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1983), which 
were favorably cited by this court in Griffin. 
In Prestigiacomo, the interrogator did not 
clarify the defendant's equivocal request for 
counsel. 504 F. Supp. at 682. Instead, he 
asked defendant whether he would continue to 
answer questions. Id. After receiving an affi-
rmative response, he proceeded to interrogate 
him. Id. The court in that case found the 
interrogator had given "the impression that 
what defendant said would not be treated as a 
sign, albeit an equivocal one, that he wished a 
lawyer." Id. at 684. That tactic was improper 
and, consequently, the court suppressed the 
statements which resulted from further inter-
rogation. Id. 
In Moulds, the defendant made an equiv-
ocal request for counsel. 673 P.2d at 1083. 
Instead of clarifying the request, the interro-
gator recognized defendant's right, informed 
defendant that the decision was his to make, 
and then proceeded to discuss the case with 
defendant. Id. Thereafter, the defendant made 
incriminating remarks. Id. The Idaho court 
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found that defendant's "statements were the 
products of interrogation continued at the 
instance of the police after the right to counsel 
had been invoked/ Id. at 1085. Consequently, 
the court affirmed the suppression of the sta-
tements. Id. 
The fatal flaw in both Prestigiacomo and 
Moulds was the failure to cease interrogation 
except for the very limited purpose of clarif-
ying whether defendant wished to assert his 
right to counsel. The fact that defendant 
continued to answer questions was not a suf-
ficient indication that he was abandoning his 
right to counsel. In contrast, Griffin serves as 
an example of a valid waiver of Miranda 
rights following clarification of an ambiguous 
reference to counsel. In Griffin, defendant was 
advised of his Miranda rights, which he 
waived. 754 P.2d at 966. However, during the 
ensuing interview there came a time when he 
said, "I'm calling an attorney." Id. The inte-
rrogating officer immediately asked, "OK, are 
you saying you don't want to talk anymore?"18 
Id. at 966-67. Defendant's response indi-
cated he would continue to talk to the detec-
tive at that time, but planned to talk to an 
attorney later. Id. at 967. Thus, although the 
conviction in Griffin was reversed on other 
grounds, further interrogation following the 
clarifying exchange just described was held not 
violative of defendant's Miranda rights. 
Defendant's statement in this case included 
a reference to an attorney which is properly 
classed as an equivocal request for counsel. 
Because Sgt. Elliot's warnings were the only 
Miranda warnings which defendant received 
before undergoing custodial interrogation, it 
was necessary that someone clarify that equi-
vocal request before defendant could be sub-
jected to custodial interrogation. Defendant's 
request was never clarified and, consequently, 
the state failed to demonstrate a valid waiver 
of defendant's right to counsel. The trial 
court erred in holding to the contrary. We 
accordingly reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
Because the trial court concluded that def-
endant's Miranda rights had not been viol-
ated, the parties did not have occasion to 
argue which evidence had to be excluded and 
whether any exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule might apply.19 On remand, the parties 
must of course be allowed to argue these 
various points. After entertaining these argu-
ments, the trial court must exclude all primary 
evidence elicited during the custodial interro-
gation and all incriminating evidence derived 
therefrom which is not saved by an exception 
to the exclusionary rule. Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431,441 (1984). 
Our decision is a difficult one and will be a 
source of consternation to many, who will 
question why the state should be put to the 
cost and burden of having to retry someone 
who clearly is guilty. But while the results in 
particular cases may be unwelcome, "[t]he 
fifth amendment exclusionary rule is clearly 
dictated by the Constitution and is the only 
possible means of protecting the values unde-
r ly ing the p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-
incrimination." M. Gardner, The Emerging 
Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-
A Critique, 35 Hastings L.J. 429, 466 (1984). 
We accordingly reverse and remand for proc-
eedings consistent with this opinion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. These purposes were again repeated during the 
exam, with even more specificity. Later in the exam, 
Sgt. Elliot stated: 
Okay, good, okay, uh, at the beginning 
of the test I told you what the things 
were that we needed to show. Number 
one is that you did not arrange with 
anyone to take the child but that you 
haven't got someone taking care of her, 
she is not hidden out and you are not 
doing this to deprive Antoinette visita-
tion of the child. And, uh, secondly, 
you did nothing to injure the child and 
you, and if she in fact is not alive, did 
not cause her death, right? 
2. It is not clear from the record why Sgt. Elliot 
stated that he had to advise defendant of his rights 
"again." It is clear, however, that the first and only 
Miranda warnings defendant received prior to his 
formal arrest were given by Sgt. Elliot at the outset 
of the polygraph examination. 
3. The specific inculpatory questions asked during 
the examination were: 
1) Have you caused the death of 
Miyako? 
2) Do you know where Miyako is hidden 
now? 
3) Have you arranged the disappearance 
of Miyako? 
4. It is not entirely clear why the sheriff did not give 
defendant his Miranda warnings. Apparently, 
however, he relied upon Sgt. Elliot's explanation 
that defendant had been "Mirandized." 
5. At least one Utah case has recognized 
"preponderance of the evidence" as the appropriate 
standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
waiver of Miranda rights. See State v. Moore, 697 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). The preponderance sta-
ndard is difficult to square with Miranda's holding 
that the state bears a heavy burden, if counsel was 
not present, to show a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights. See Miran-
da v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has 
adopted the "preponderance of the evidence" test in 
evaluating Miranda waiver questions. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515,523 (1986). 
6. The court's comment on coercion represents a bit 
of an overstatement in view of Miranda's recogni-
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tion that custodial interrogation is inherently coer-
cive. See 384 U.S. at 467. 
7. Despite the court's phraseology in its remarks 
from the bench, it is apparent from the record that 
defendant never made any "subsequent requests" for 
counsel after his statement to Sgt. Elliot. 
8. Under certain circumstances, even defendants 
who are told they are free to leave will nonetheless 
be held to have been subjected to custodial interro-
gation. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F*2d 
466,467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
9. According to the transcript of the polygraph 
examination, the polygraph machine was attached to 
defendant by two tubes encircling his trunk, finger 
plates on his ring and index fingers, and a blood 
pressure cuff on his right arm. 
10. In view of the result we reach, we need not 
decide in this case whether the polygraph examina-
tion as such was accusatory interrogation and 
whether defendant was in custody from the incep-
tion of the exam. We note, however, that numerous 
courts have leaned toward finding such examinat-
ions to be custodial, a view which seems to 
command majority support and to be well-
reasoned. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 
477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (noting that strict 
Miranda-type analysis is typically applied to poly-
graph confessions); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 439 
Penn. 34, 264 A.2d 706, 707 (1970) (state's sugges-
tion that defendant was not in custody for polyg-
raph was "attempt to have (court] submerge [its] 
intelligence"); State v. Fallcr, 111 N.W.2d 433, 435 
(S.D. 1975) ("situation a lie detector test presents 
can best be described as a psychological rubber 
hose"); Creeks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. 
1976) (where investigation has focused on defen-
dant, Miranda warnings required before polygraph); 
People v. Carter, 1 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
546, 549 (1970) ("Questioning during the course of a 
lie deteaor test certainly qualifies as a form of 
custodial interrogation."), overruled on other 
grounds, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
313 (1972). But see, e.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 
1346, 1352 (Del. 1980)("appearance at the police 
station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver 
of his Miranda rights"), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 910 
(1982); People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356, 527 
N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988) (willingness to aid in 
investigation demonstrated that polygraph not cus-
todial). 
11. The state cites testimony to the effect that def-
endant did not consider himself under arrest even 
after he was formally arrested, suggesting this 
demonstrates that defendant could not have believed 
he was in custody when he first confessed. This 
evidence is at most a commentary on defendant's 
acumen. Under the objective "reasonable person" 
test, defendant's subjective belief about custody is 
not relevant. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
442(1984). 
12. But see note 10, supra. It is interesting to note 
that the polygraph examiner considered Miranda 
warnings at the outset of the polygraph examination 
to be a necessity. He stated: "Because you are in the 
cop shop there is no doubt in your mind that this is 
the police station and, uh, because you are in taking 
a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must 
advise you of your rights ...." But see People v. 
Sohn, 148 A.D.2d 553, 539 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (1989) 
(mem.) (giving of Miranda warnings was 
"apparently out of an 'excess of caution' [and did] 
not preclude a finding that [defendant] was not in 
custody"). 
Sergeant Elliot's approach, whether or not legally 
required, surely seems prudent, if for no other 
reason than that it forecloses the possibility a 
suspect will blurt out a confession after his decep-
tion has been ascertained but before Miranda war-
nings can be issued. Moreover, as an arm of the 
state, the police have a responsibility to protect the 
constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on 
the side of giving the Miranda warnings before they 
are strictly required advances that function, as well 
as minimizes the risk that important evidence will be 
excluded because the warnings were not given early 
enough in the process. 
13. As indicated previously, Sheriff Hayward app-
arently relied upon Sgt. Elliot's claim that defen-
dant had been properly "Mirandized" at the com-
mencement of the polygraph exam. Although 
Sheriff Hayward, out of the same abundance of 
caution that may have motivated Sgt. Elliot, should 
ideally have given new Miranda warnings to defen-
dant prior to interrogating him, the earlier warnings 
would have sufficed had Sgt. Elliot elicited a clear 
waiver of those rights from defendant at that time. See 
State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 
1979) (the law does not require repetition of Miranda 
rights within a short period of time and a 
continuous sequence of events even though defen-
dant's status may actually change in the interim). 
The state did not argue that Sheriff Hayward's 
"good faith" reliance upon Sgt. Elliot's claim he 
previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an 
exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we 
note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth 
Amendment area, courts have declined to create a 
"good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth 
Amendment. United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 
1544 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("once a suspect 
has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that 
request is imputed to all law enforcement officers 
who subsequently deal with the suspect"). See also 
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101 (1988) 
(implicitly rejecting "good faith" argument); White 
v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(declining to create exception absent clear indication 
from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other 
grounds, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984). 
An excellent treatment of a possible "good faith" 
exception to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule 
is found in M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith 
Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 
Hastings L.J. 429 (1984). Professor Gardner concl-
udes: 
While there may be reason to doubt the 
constitutional necessity of the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule, the fifth 
amendment privilege is itself a constit-
utionally required exclusionary rule. 
Whereas a fourth amendment violation 
occurs at the moment of the unlawful 
privacy violation, violations of the pri-
vilege against self-incrimination do not 
occur unless and until the government 
uses the tainted evidence against the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding. 
Although alternatives to the exclusionary 
rule might conceivably be developed to 
protect fourth amendment privacy inte-
rests, no alternative could possibly 
protect the fifth amendment values of 
maintaining an accusatorial system and 
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respecting the dignity of criminal defe-
ndants. If use of compelled self-
incriminating evidence is permitted, the 
fifth amendment's protection is destr-
oyed. 
/d. at 462-63. 
14. We note that defendant was given a second set 
of Miranda warnings after he had informed Sheriff 
Hayward that his daughter was dead, gone with the 
police to American Fork to retrieve the body, been 
arrested, and been returned to Salt Lake City. 
Apparently recognizing that by that time all the 
damage had been done, the state does not argue the 
second set of Miranda warnings are of any conseq-
uence to our analysis. Defendant, on the other 
hand, argues that because he had previously invoked 
his right to counsel, albeit equivocally; had not been 
provided an attorney; and had not initiated any 
subsequent interrogation with the police, the fruits 
of the post-arrest interrogations must also be 
suppressed. We agree. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477 (1981), the United States Supreme Court 
held that once a defendant has invoked his right to 
counsel, statements made without counsel in subse-
quent interrogations initiated by the police, even 
when pursuant to renewed Miranda warnings, must 
be suppressed. Id. at 484-87. See also State v. 
Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985) (accused 
must initiate conversation). The rule in Edwards 
applies even more forcefully in a case such as this 
where the subsequent interrogation is prompted by, 
and designed to explain, information which has 
come to the police as a direct result of an earlier 
Miranda violation. 
15. "Equivocal request" appears to be an imprecise 
term in this context. Many of the references to att-
orneys which are held to be equivocal requests for 
counsel are not requests at all. It may be preferable 
to refer to such statements as "equivocal references 
to an attorney." See, e.g., Note, The Right to 
Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal 
References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159 
(1986) [hereinafter "The Vanderbilt Note"]. 
16. See The Vanderbilt Note at 1187 (clarification 
approach represents "a middle position"). 
17. The state also argued below that defendant's 
signing the written waiver form, on the heels of his 
"willing to get it over with" comment, clarified that 
his position was to waive his right to counsel. At 
least one court has accepted this argument. See State 
v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003 
(1983). In Smith, the defendant signed a waiver 
form subsequent to his equivocal reference to 
counsel and then proceeded to speak with the offi-
cers. Our Washington counterpart found those facts 
sufficient to demonstrate a waiver on the part of the 
defendant. 
We decline to adopt the Washington position for 
three reasons. First, we find the position inconsis-
tent with the presumption against waiver. See Stare 
v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987). Second, 
we have already noted that once a defendant 
invokes his right to counsel, statements made in 
subsequent interrogations, without counsel present 
and even if pursuant to renewed warnings, must also 
be suppressed unless defendant initiates the contact. 
See note 14, supra. If police cannot circumvent the 
rule through renewed Miranda warnings days after a 
request for counsel, we see no reason to allow them 
to do so through a simple waiver form given on the 
heels of the equivocal reference without any clarifi-
cation. Finally, other courts have not found a 
waiver where the defendant has signed a waiver 
form immediately after an unclarified, equivocal 
reference to counsel. See, e.g., United States v. 
Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681, 682-84 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.). Cf. United States v. 
Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T)he 
police may not use a statement a suspect makes 
after an equivocal request for counsel, but before 
the request is clarified, as an effective waiver of the 
right to counsel."). Especially in this case, that 
approach makes sense. Once defendant made an 
equivocal reference to counsel, as explained in the 
text Sgt. Elliot could properly do only one thing-
seek clarification. Instead, he concluded that defe-
ndant was "not worried," that they should "proceed 
... and get it over with ....," and he submitted the 
written form to defendant for signature. In effect, 
submission of the written form to defendant was an 
integral part of Sgt. Elliot's conduct which was at 
odds with his duty to clarify and as such, the 
written form cannot be taken as clarifying defen-
dant's equivocal request. 
18. The main problem inherent in the clarification 
approach is "the additional opportunity given to law 
enforcement officials to ... [usej clarifying questions 
to dissuade" suspects from asserting their right to 
counsel. The Notre Dame Note at 472. See Ande-
rson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1984); 
Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 1982) 
(permissible for officer to "seek clarification of the 
suspect's desires, as long as he does not disguise the 
clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or intimi-
dation"). See also Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 
F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (during purported 
effort to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining 
counsel may not be in defendant's best interest); 
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1985) (during purported effort to clarify, 
officer emphasized delay and complexity of obtai-
ning an attorney). 
One commentator has suggested that only one 
question should be permitted to seek clarification. 
With our embellishment in the form of an introdu-
ctory statement, that question is as follows: You 
have been advised of your rights, including the right 
to have an attorney with you during this interview 
even if you cannot afford to hire one. What you 
just said leads me to wonder whether or not you 
wish to avail yourself of that right. "Do you want 
the assistance of [an attorney] at this time or do you 
agree to answer questions without the presence of 
[an attorney]?" Comment, Equivocal Requests for 
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Conside-
rations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 782 (1987). 
19. The "independent source doctrine" and 
"inevitable discovery rule" are among the exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Northrup, 756 
P.2d 1288, 1292-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
state had no occasion to argue either exception, on 
appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to 
determine whether either of these exceptions might 
apply in this case to some of the evidence which 
might otherwise have to be suppressed. 
"The independent source doctrine allows admis-
sion of evidence that has been discovered by means 
wholly independent of any constitutional violation." 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). Thus, 
any evidence which was discovered apart from def-
endant's statements made during custodial interro-
gation need not be excluded. 
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission 
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of evidence as long as "the prosecution can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the infor-
mation ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. See, e.g., 
People v. Freeman, 739 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1987) (body of deceased victim was so consp-
icuously located that discovery was inevitable); State 
v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 (1985) 
(hotel maid would inevitably have discovered body 
of deceased victim within 56 hours of actual disco-
very and reported discovery to police), cert, denied, 
475 U.S. 1141 (1986). Under this rule, the prosecu-
tion must show that the evidence "would" have been 
discovered, not simply that it "could" or "might" 
have been discovered. Miller, 709 P.2d at 242. See also 
United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 
(10th Cir. 1982). It is altogether unclear from the 
record before us how much, if any, of the evidence 
discovered as a result of the improper custodial 
interrogation would inevitably have been discovered. 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff Robert E. Conger appeals from an 
adverse jury verdict on negligence, and the 
trial court's directed verdict striking down his 
strict product liability claim against defendant 
Tel Tech. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In March 1979, Conger 's employer, 
Meadow Gold, purchased a milk tanker from 
Western General Dairies. The tanker had two 
eliptical stainless steel tanks used for transp-
orting milk. A ladder led to the top of each 
tank. It was Conger's responsibility to collect 
raw milk with the tanker from several dairy 
farms and take it to Meadow Gold's proces-
sing plant in Salt Lake City. After the milk 
was pumped out of the tanks, he would clean 
the inside of each tank. He did this by clim-
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bing down into the tanks through an access 
hatch on each tank and scrubbing the inside 
with a special brush and detergents. 
In May 1979, Meadow Gold entered into an 
oral agreement with Tel Tech, wherein Tel 
Tech was to sell and install a cleaning mech-
anism in the milk tanker. The mechanism 
consisted of two spray balls, one for each 
tank, welded to the top of each tank. By att-
aching a hose to the spray balls, cleaning and 
rinsing solutions could then be pumped into 
the tanks without the necessity of anyone cli-
mbing inside. The spray balls were placed on 
top of each tank opposite the ladders, requi-
ring the operator to walk across the top of the 
tanker from the ladders to the spray balls to 
attach the hoses. Tel Tech did not install any 
type of walk protection across the top of the 
tanker and did not advise Meadow Gold to do 
so, nor did Meadow Gold inquire about safety 
measures. 
On January 1, 1981, Conger stepped over 
the tanker's hatch to attach a hose to the 
spray ball, slipped on a spot of grease or milk 
fat, and fell from the tanker, suffering serious 
injuries. He had used the spray balls regularly 
for over a year without mishap, between three 
and four hundred times. He had also compl-
ained to Meadow Gold management that using 
the spray balls was unsafe because of the fall 
hazard. 
Conger filed a complaint, naming Tel Tech 
and others as defendants. The claims against 
all other defendants were settled. The claim 
against Tel Tech proceeded to trial. Conger 
presented evidence on theories of negligence 
and strict product liability. There was a 
dispute as to whether Conger should be 
allowed to present a strict liability theory 
because the pleadings contained only a negli-
gence claim. However, the trial judge gave 
Conger leave to amend the pleadings and 
concluded that Tel Tech, through the course 
of discovery, had sufficient notice of Conger's 
strict liability theory to justify amending the 
pleadings. 
After all the evidence was presented, the 
court granted Tel Tech's motion for a directed 
verdict against Conger's strict liability claim, 
so only submitted the negligence claim to the 
jury. The court instructed the jury to disregard 
evidence relating to Conger's strict product 
liability theory. In response to specific interr-
ogatories, the jury concluded that neither Tel 
Tech nor Conger was negligent. 
Conger appeals, primarily on the grounds 
that (1) the court improperly dismissed his 
product liability claim; and (2) the court's 
jury instructions were vague and confusing, 
thus creating the necessity for a new trial on 
the negligence theory as well. 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
In reviewing the directed verdict, we cons-
ider the evidence in the light most favorable to 
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